Compensation Report
4. Architecture of compensation of the Group Executive Committee
The compensation for the Group Executive Committee includes a fixed annual base salary, a variable short-term element, a variable long-term element, participation in a management share plan and occupational benefits and perquisites.
Architecture of compensation of the Group Executive Committee
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Purpose |
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Drivers |
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Performance measures |
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Vehicle |
Annual base salary (ABS) |
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Attract & retain |
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Position, experience and qualifications |
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Monthly cash payments |
Variable short-term compensation element (short-term incentive, STI) |
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Pay for performance |
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Role and area of responsibility |
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Group net profit |
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Annual cash payment |
Variable long-term compensation element (long-term incentive, LTI) |
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Reward long-term, sustained performance; align with shareholders’ interests; retain |
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Role and area of responsibility |
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Relative total shareholder return (rTSR); increase in earnings per share (EPS) |
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Conditional rights to restricted shares A (Performance Share Units) |
Zehnder Group Management Share Plan (ZGMSP) |
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Align with shareholders’ interests, retain |
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Level of position |
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Share price evolution |
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Discounted registered shares A |
Benefits |
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Protect against risks, attract & retain |
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Market practice and position |
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Retirement plan, insurances, perquisites |
4.1 Annual base salary (ABS)
The annual base salary is determined individually on the basis of the scope and responsibilities associated with the position and the experience and qualifications of the individual. The annual base salary is reviewed annually, and adjustments reflect individual performance, current salary, competitive positioning, market salary trends and the affordability to the company.
4.2 Variable short-term compensation element (short-term incentive, STI)
The STI enables the Group Executive Committee to participate in the Group’s current success. It is disbursed in the form of a cash payment in line with the profit-sharing plan. For each position, a profit-sharing amount is determined, taking into account the impact on the operating result, company strategy and responsibilities. The STI amount paid out for the fiscal year corresponds to the profit-sharing amount multiplied by the Group net profit (in EUR million). As of the reporting year, the STI can only be paid if a Group net profit of at least 60% of the budget value is achieved (lower limit, adjusted for non-budgeted one-off effects such as company acquisitions). This aligns with the STI principles of the other executives of the Zehnder Group. Considering the profit-sharing characteristic of the formula, there is no formal target level for this STI. However, there is a contractually agreed upper limit for the STI amount. It is set at 100% of the annual base salary for the CEO and 75% for all other members of the Group Executive Committee.
Calculation of the STI amount:
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Individual profit-sharing amount (EUR) |
× |
Group net profit (EUR million) |
= |
STI amount (EUR) |
Example |
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2,000 |
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40 |
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80,000 |
The STI amount for any given fiscal year is paid in the spring of the following year.
The decision to exclusively and directly link the STI to the company’s financial result (Group net profit) is based on the conviction that performance management should not be directly linked to compensation. As regard to the STI, the main focus is on the collective performance as a whole. For the CEO and the other members of the Group Executive Committee, within the framework of the global performance management process, the performance objectives are derived directly from the business strategy by the Board of Directors at the start of each year and reviewed at regular intervals. Such reviews take place at the request of the Nomination and Compensation Committee. These performance objectives include financial, strategic and more qualitative objectives, for example, in the area of leadership and project management.
In case of termination of employment during the first half of the fiscal year, the STI is calculated pro-rata temporis, based on the pay-out level of the previous year. In case of termination of employment during the second half of the year, the published half-year figures for the pro rata temporis calculation are used. In case of termination of employment at the end of the year, the published annual results apply.
The STI is subject to clawback and malus provisions in the event that the company is required to prepare a relevant accounting/financial restatement or in the event of legal provisions or internal regulations having been violated.
4.3 Variable long-term compensation element (long-term incentive, LTI)
As part of a long-term share plan, the LTI is granted in the form of Performance Share Units (PSUs). The LTI rewards the long-term performance and the sustainable success of the Zehnder Group and is aligned to the interests of the shareholders.
A PSU represents a conditional right to receive shares of the company. The prerequisite for this is the fulfilment of certain conditions during the three-year performance period (vesting period). The vesting conditions include both the attainment of the predefined performance objectives (performance conditions) and continuous and ongoing employment at the end of the vesting period (service condition).
The features of the LTI can be summarised as follows: at grant date, a target amount in relation to the LTI is determined for each member of the Group Executive Committee, taking the relevant benchmark for the individual total compensation into account.
In 2021, the allocation of the target amount consisted of 50% of the annual base salary for the CEO and no more than 50% of the annual base salary for the other members of the Group Executive Committee.
On the grant date, the individual target amount is converted into the relevant number of PSUs based on the average volume-weighted share price of Zehnder Group AG on the SIX Swiss Exchange during the period from 1 October to 31 December of the year before the grant date.
50% of the performance condition is based on the relative total shareholder return (rTSR) and the remaining 50% is based on the increase in earnings per share (EPS growth). The rTSR is the achieved increase in value for the investor (that is, the share price performance plus dividend) in comparison with a peer group.
Peer group
The peer group for the relative TSR measure comprises a universe of comparable companies that have already been taken into account for compensation benchmarking purposes and have remained unchanged from the previous year. The Board of Directors confirmed that the following companies were comparable:
Arbonia |
Belimo |
Bobst |
Bossard |
Burckhardt Compression |
Burkhalter |
Bystronic (formerly Conzzeta) |
Daetwyler |
Feintool |
Forbo |
Gurit |
Huber+Suhner |
Interroll |
Komax |
Landis+Gyr |
Metall Zug |
Meier Tobler |
Phoenix Mecano |
Rieter |
Schweiter |
Starrag |
Rewarding long-term performance
The total number of shares that are transferred to the participants after the vesting period is calculated as shown below. The performance factor can range between 0 and 150%, with no conversion into shares carried out below the threshold. The conversion into shares is limited to a maximum of 1.5 shares per PSU.
For both key figures, the Nomination and Compensation Committee defines a lower limit for the performance level (with no vesting taking place below this limit), a target value (100% vesting) and an upper limit for the performance level (150% vesting). Between these levels, vesting is calculated on a linear basis.
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Lower limit 25% (EPS) 50% (TSR) vesting |
Target value 100% vesting |
Cap 150% vesting |
rTSR (50%) |
25% percentile rank |
Median of the peer group |
≥75% percentile rank |
EPS growth (50%) |
–2 PP of the target value |
EPS growth target value |
+4 PP of target value |
EPS: earnings per share, rTSR: relative total shareholder return
The achievement of the relative performance measure and the combined performance factor are calculated by an external independent consultancy company. If the Zehnder Group reports a loss from ongoing business activities during the last year of the three-year vesting period or in other exceptional cases, the Board of Directors reserves the right to specify whether and to what extent the PSUs will lapse for this period, regardless of the combined performance factor achieved.
In case of termination of employment, the blocked PSUs usually lapse, except in the event of retirement, disability, death or a change of control at the company. These provisions are outlined individually in the table below.
Reason for release |
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Plan rules for blocked PSUs |
Termination by employee |
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Lapse |
Termination of employment by employer for good cause |
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Lapse |
Termination of employment by employer (other causes) |
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Discretion of the Board of Directors |
Retirement |
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Discretion of the Board of Directors |
Invalidity |
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Pro rata vesting, based on effective performance at regular vesting point in time |
Death |
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Accelerated pro rata vesting based on target performance (100% payment factor) |
Change of control |
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Accelerated, full vesting based on effective performance at the point of change of control (except if the plan is continued or replaced with an equivalent) |
PSUs or shares granted as part of the long-term share plan are subject to the same clawback and sunset clauses as the STI.
In the event of a participant failing to adhere to reporting regulations and/or committing fraud and/or breaching legal provisions or relevant internal regulations, the applicable clauses enable the Board of Directors to declare that any variable cash compensation elements that have not been paid out or long-term incentives that have not yet been transferred are forfeited, either in part or in full (penalty clause), and/or to reclaim in part or in full any variable cash compensation elements that have been paid out or long-term incentives that have been transferred.
Shareholding guidelines
To align the interests of the Group Executive Committee more closely with those of the shareholders, shareholding guidelines were introduced from the 2019 fiscal year onwards. Within five years of the introduction of the share ownership provision or after their appointment to the Group Executive Committee, the members of the Group Executive Committee must hold at least a multiple of their annual basic compensation in Zehnder Group AG shares, as shown in the table below.
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% of annual base salary |
CEO |
200% |
Other members of the Group Executive Committee |
150% |
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
4.4 Long-term benefits: Zehnder Group Management Share Plan (ZGMSP)
The Zehnder Group Management Share Plan (ZGMSP) is a long-term benefit programme with the objective of encouraging members of the Group Executive Committee and all employees at management level to directly participate in the long-term success of the company. The Group Executive Committee members may elect to draw up to 30% of their annual base salary in the form of Zehnder Group AG registered shares A. These shares are offered at a discount of 30% on the relevant share price determined as the average volume-weighted share price of the share during the period between 1 October and 31 December. The shares are subject to a restriction period of three years during which they cannot be sold, transferred or pledged. The restriction period also applies in case of termination of employment, except in case of death, where the restriction immediately lapses.
The ZGMSP strengthens the link between compensation and company long-term performance, as the compensation invested in the programme is exposed to the change in share value over the restriction period of three years.
4.5 Benefits
As the Group Executive Committee is international by nature, the members participate in the benefit plans available in the country of their employment contract. Benefits consist mainly of retirement, insurance and healthcare plans that are designed to provide a reasonable level of protection for the employees and their dependants in respect of retirement and as concerns the risks of disability, death or illness/accident.
The members of the Group Executive Committee holding a Swiss employment contract participate in the pension plan offered to all employees in Switzerland, in which earnings up to an amount of CHF 700,000 per annum are insured. The Zehnder Group’s pension benefits exceed the legal requirements of the Swiss Federal Law on Occupational Retirement, Survivors and Disability Pension Plans (BVG) and are comparable to the conditions offered by other international industrial companies.
Members of the Group Executive Committee under foreign employment contracts are insured in line with market conditions and with their position. Each plan varies depending on the local competitive and legal environment and are structured in accordance with local practice and in line with the local legal requirements.
In addition, the members of the Group Executive Committee are also eligible for standard perquisites such as a company car, child allowances, access to subsidised staff restaurants and other benefits in kind, according to competitive market practice in their country of contract. The monetary value of these other elements of compensation is evaluated at fair value and is included in the compensation tables.
Expenses that are not covered by the lump sum remuneration for expense allowance in accordance with the company’s expenses regulations are compensated upon presentation of documentary evidence. The reimbursement of business expenses is not considered compensation and does not need to be approved by the Annual General Meeting.
4.6 Contracts of members of the Group Executive Committee
The employment contracts of the members of the Group Executive Committee are unlimited. They incorporate a notice period of a minimum of six to a maximum of twelve months and feature a non-competition clause, which is limited to two years after termination of the employment relationship while providing an entitlement to a maximum of the annual base salary. There are no agreements with regard to severance compensation in connection with leaving the company or a ‘change of control’ except for the accelerated vesting of the PSUs or early unblocking of shares, as described above.